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Finding A Better Way Around Employment At
Will: Protecting Employees' Autonomy
Interests Through Tort Law
WILLIAM R. CORBETTt
I.

INTRODUCTION

Bonnie O'Daniel was fired, ostensibly for posting to her
Facebook page a photo of a man at a Target store wearing a
dress and derisively commenting on his ability to use the
same restroom or dressing room as her daughters.' The post
allegedly offended her employer's president, a member of the
LGBT community, and resulted in her termination. 2 She
sued, asserting numerous claims, including reverse sex
retaliation and violation of her right of freedom of expression
under the Louisiana Constitution. 3 Her claims were

t

Frank L. Maraist and Wex S. Malone Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law
Center of Louisiana State University. I am grateful to Dean Thomas C. Galligan,

Jr. and the LSU Law Center for a research grant.

1. O'Daniel v. Indus. Serv. Sol., No. 17-190-RLB, 2018 WL 265585, at *1
(M.D. La. Jan. 1, 2018), appeal filed, 18-30136 (5th Cir. Jan. 31, 2018). O'Daniel's
post read: "So meet, ROBERTa! Shopping in the women's department for a

swimsuit at the BR Target. For all of you people that say you don't care what
bathroom it's using, you're full of shit!! Let this try to walk in the women's

bathroom while my daughters are in there!! #hellwillfreezeoverfirst." Id. at *8
n.1.

2. Id. at *1.
3. Id. at *1-2.
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dismissed.4
Renee Gork was a reporter for a Fayetteville radio
station that covered University of Arkansas Razorback
athletics. 5 She was fired after wearing a Florida Gators cap
to the press conference of University of Arkansas head
football coach, Bobby Petrino.6 Coach Petrino commented on
the cap. 7 Ms. Gork got a job in Gainesville, Florida with a
radio station owned by the University of Florida, which was
her alma mater.8 Ms. Gork apparently did not sue her former
employer.
Janelle Perez, a police officer, was fired for having an
extramarital affair with a fellow officer and sued her
employer, the city of Roseville, California. 9 A Ninth Circuit
panel held that the officer was fired in violation of her
constitutional rights to privacy and intimate association. 10
It is debatable whether any of these three employees

4. The court explained that the plaintiffs claim under the state constitution

failed because the protections are the same as those in the First Amendment of
the federal Constitution, and governmental action is required. To the extent the
plaintiff was asserting a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy,
Louisiana does not recognize the tort theory. The court explained that the

retaliation for sex was actually a claim based on oppositionto sexual orientation
discrimination, and Title VH, under Fifth Circuit precedent, does not cover sexual
orientation. Id. at *7.

5. See, e.g., Caroline Howard, Renee Gork And What Not To Wear To Work,
FORBES (Aug. 17, 2010, 8:44 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/carolinehoward

/2010/08/1 7/renee-gork-and-what-not-to-wear-to-work/#4d9aaef22bf.
6. Id.
7. "And that will be the last question I answer with that hat on," Petrino
said. Id. According to the radio station, Coach Petrino and the university played

no role in its decision to fire Ms. Gork. Russell Goldman, Reporter Renee Gork
17, 2010),
(Aug.
Fired in Rival Team Cap Flap, ABC NEWS
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/reporter-renee-gork-fired-rival-team-cap-flap/

story?id=11422213.
8. Hat gets reporter fired - then hired, CNN (Oct. 4, 2010, 3:30 PM),
http://www.wmcactionnews5.com/story/13323668/controversial-hat-costsreporter-her-job.

9. Perez v. Cityof Roseville, 882 F.3d 843, 848-50 (9thCir. 2018).
10. Id. at 854.
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should recover damages from their former employers based
on their terminations. The pertinent issue here is whether
they even have a viable basis for asserting claims. Ms.
O'Daniel and Ms. Gork did not have viable legal claims for
their terminations because they were private-sector
employees. Ms. Perez did have a colorable claim because she
was a government employee.
The cases are legion in which employees are terminated
when employers attempt to regulate or oversee employees'
conduct or expressions that the employees consider to be
their own personal concerns. This area of employment law is
often referred to as "privacy."" However, the better
descriptive term for the diverse employee interests is
"autonomy," meaning self-governance: "the right and ability
to control one's own decisions and actions."1 2 The
Restatement of Employment Law proposes protecting these
interests when they are outside the employment relationship
and do not affect the business. 13 It provides an illustrative
list: engaging in lawful conduct outside of work; holding or
expressing political, moral, ethical, religious, or other
personal beliefs outside of work; and belonging to or
participating in lawful associations when the membership or
participation does not affect the employer.14
Private-sector employees fired by their employers for
pursuit of their autonomy interests have limited legal

11. A leading treatise on the subject is entitled Privacy in Employment Law.
MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW ix-xx (3d ed. 2009). Perusal of

the table of contents reveals the variety of topics covered: in part, medical
screening and testing; drug, alcohol, and tobacco screening and testing;
psychological screening and testing; monitoring employee performance and
conduct; and control of employees (including various categories of association and
expression). Id. at xxi-xxxvi. Thus, we amalgamate many diverse rights and
interests within the term "privacy."

12. Matthew T. Bodie, The Best Way Out Is Always Through: Changing the
Employment At-Will Default Rule to Protect PersonalAutonomy, 2017 U. ILL. L.

REV. 223, 238 (2017).
13. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
14. Id.

§

7.08 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
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recourse. A couple of legal principles have stunted
development of the legal protection accorded to employees'
autonomy interests in the United States. The first is a matter
of constitutional law. the First Amendment protections (for
speech, expression, association, etc.) and the Fourth
Amendment protections (prohibition of unreasonable search
and seizure) are restrictions on government action. Thus,
private-sector employers are not restricted in the absence of
government action.1 5 The second is a matter of state
termination law. forty-nine states in the nation adhere to the
"doctrine" of employment at will, 1 6 pursuant to which
employers, in the absence of a contractual or statutory
restriction, may fire employees "for a good reason, a bad
reason, or no reason at all."1 7 The result is that private sector
employees can be disciplined or terminated for their conduct
or expression without a remedy under circumstances in
which public-sector employees might have a remedy for
violation of their rights under the First or Fourth
Amendments and analogous state constitutional provisions.
Restatement of
Institute's
Law
American
The
18
adopts a position that would create
Employment Law
increased protection of employees' autonomy rights by a
modification of the employment-at-will presumption.1 9 The
Restatement advocates carving out part of employment at
will and replacing it with a default rule based on an implied
contract term between the employer and employee. 20 Under

15. Bodie, supra note 12, at 256.
16. Montana abrogated employment at will by enacting, in 1987, the Montana
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914.
17. E.g., Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 606 (2008); Payne
v. W & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-20 (1884); Bodie, supra note 12, at 224-32.
18. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw

§

7.08. For a scholarly debate about the

wisdom of undertaking the Restatement of Employment Law project, see U.C.
Hastings Symposium on the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law, 13 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1 (2009).
19. Bodie, supra note 12, at 265.
20. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW,

§

7.08 cmt. f. Autonomy as Default Rule
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that rule, the employer could not lawfully fire the employee
for conduct that does not occur in the context of the
employment relationship and that does not have a
significant impact on the employment relationship. 2 1
Professor Matthew Bodie, a co-reporter on the Restatement,
has written an important and provocative article in support
of the Restatement position. 22
I agree that private sector employees' autonomy
interests merit greater protection and that the employmentat-will doctrine is the salient legal tenet empowering
employers to interfere with those interests. 2 3 I also agree
that the common law offers an important and necessary
vehicle for limiting employment at will and expanding
protection of employees' autonomy interests. 2 4 However, I

(stating "[t]he premise of this Section is that the parties to every employment

relationship implicitly agree to the level of protection stated in the Section. This
implied understanding may be altered by the parties' express agreement. To

change this default rule, the parties would have to agree that off-duty lawful
conduct, adherence to or expression of beliefs, or membership in lawful
associations maybe the subject of the employer's adverse personnel action.").
21. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw

§ 7.08.

22. See generally Bodie, supra note 12.
23. I will note, however, that modifying or limiting employment at will would
leave employees susceptible to other adverse employment actions for exercising
their autonomy. On the issue of whether the law should restrict employer
interference by adverse employment actions other than termination, see infra
note 96.
24. There is a patchwork of federal, state, and local statutes that protect
various aspects of employee autonomy, including the Electronic Communications

Privacy Act (and Stored Communications Act), a plethora of whistleblower
statutes, state off-duty activities statutes, and more. See, e.g., STEVEN L.
WILLBORN ET. AL, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES & MATERIALS, at Part
(6th ed.
2017). A limitation of statutory protections, however, is that they often are very
specific as to what activity they protect. More general and elastic protection can

nI

be achieved by common law protection. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, The Need
for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 91, 95-96,

161-62 (2003); J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law: A
Modest Proposal to De-Marginalize Employment Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347 (1995)
(proposing that at-will be modified by common law adjustments). Furthermore,

passage of significant legislative restrictions on employment at will is unlikely
because of the lack of a strong lobby for it and the existence of a strong lobby

against it. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom:
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think the Restatement takes a less cogent and effective
common law approach than it should have taken. Unlike the
Restatement and Professor Bodie, I do not favor an implied
contract term as the means to provide such protection. The
better approach is by developing and expanding the tort of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. I think the
Restatement proposal, as explicated by Bodie, overestimates
both the fit and promise of a contract approach and
underestimates the fit and potential success of a tort
approach. There are several reasons to believe that a tort
approach would succeed where a contract approach would
fail. Moreover, this is a matter of great societal importancenot just a private matter between contracting parties. Tort
law intervenes to declare societal judgments, 25 to impose
duties, and to effectuate those judgments, which the parties
have not undertaken between themselves. 26 We need a
proclamation of societal judgment and value that protection
of employees' autonomy interests is important to a
democratic society that recognizes the worth of employees as
"full-fledged members of the community." 27 The tort of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, although
inadequate for the task in its current form, can be modified
and fortified to fulfill this role.
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404,
1434 (1967).

25. Bodie, supra note 12, at 261.
26. MatthewW. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, and the Law, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 221, 223 (1996).

27. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH.
L. REV. 225, 248 (2013) (quoting Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of
Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957,
968 (1989)); see also FINKIN, supra note 11, at xxxix (asserting that autonomy and
privacy play important roles in the formation and maintenance of self-identity

and that to cease to bear such rights is to be dehumanized); cf. Cynthia Estlund,
Rethinking Autocracy at Work, 131 HARv. L. REV. 795, 795 (2018) (reviewing
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: How EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES
(AND WHY WE DON'T TALK ABouT IT) (2017) (questioning "[h]ow is it that a
democratic society devoted to individual freedom came to tolerate the private
outposts of autocratic rule and unfreedom in which most citizens spend their

working lives?")).
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II. PROBLEMS WITH THE RESTATEMENTBODIE
CONTRACT APPROACH

Professor Bodie acknowledges the tort approach as an
alternative, but he advocates the contract approach as
preferable because it "better matches with the at-will rule as
well as the nuanced relationship between firms and
employees." 28 Bodie thus urges change by working within
contract doctrine despite the fact employment at will is a
presumption regarding the terms of an employment contract.
There are several problems with this proposal. First,
employment at will,
although merely a rebuttable
presumption, has exerted an overwhelming influence on the
law of contracts as applied in the context of employment. So
profound has been that influence that the proposed implied
contract term, contrary to Bodie's contention, does not
necessarily
better
reflect
the
understanding
and
expectations of the parties. Second, proposing a change in
contract doctrine within employment law does not bode well
in light of the many ways that employment at will has
distorted employment contract law. Third, the proposed
criteria that limit the protected autonomy interests-outside
of employment and not affecting the business-are of
decreasing relevance with modern technology and the
restructuring of jobs. Moreover, the limiting criteria and the
affirmative defense established by the Restatement portend
that employers would not be significantly restricted and
would win most litigated cases. Finally, even if courts
recognized the implied term, it is not clear how the law would
prevent employers from requiring employees to sign it away
as a condition of employment.
Professor Bodie makes the case that the implied term
better reflects the intent of employer and employee than the

28. Bodie, supra note 12, at 227. I rely heavily on Professor Bodie's article for
explanation of the rationale supporting the contract approach adopted by the
Restatement and for explanation of the rationale for rejection of a tort approach.
See generally id.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
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current employment-at-will doctrine; that is, most employers
and employees intend that the employer cannot fire an
employee for a personal activity or expression outside of work
that does not affect work or the employer. 29 Thus, according
to Bodie, establishing a rebuttable presumption forbidding
termination for exercises of personal autonomy accords with
the law-and-economics theory of setting default rules
according to what most parties would agree to if they
bargained about the issue. 30 It is not clear, however, that this
adjustment of the at-will presumption accords with what
most employers and employees intend and would bargain to.
Against the backdrop of roughly a century-and-a-half of
employment at will dominance, 31 employers have become
accustomed to the almost unbridled prerogative ceded to
them under employment at will.32 Many employers, no doubt
on advice of counsel, insert an at-will clause in a handbook,
manual, or other writing and have new employees sign an
acknowledgement. Employees are less certain of the law
regarding termination, although they have vague notions
about the possible illegality of unfair terminations. 33 Thus,
the argument that the proposed implied term better accords
with the intent and understanding of the parties seems
dubious. There are, however, other reasons for setting
default rules. Bodie argues that the modification would
render employment at will as more justifiable. 34 While that

29. See id. at 241,264-65.
30. Id. at 233-34.
31. Professor Andrew Morriss has chronicled the progressive adoption of
employment at will by states, beginning with Maine in 1851 and Mississippi in
1858. See generally Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and
Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679
(1994).
32.

Indeed,

Professor Bodie acknowledges

in the Reporter's Notes that

"[b]ecause it is a departure from existing law, employers might consider it to be
a 'penalty' default[.]" RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW

§

7.08 reporter's note to cmt. f

(AM. LAW INST. 2015).
33. See Bodie, supra note 12, at 225-26,226 n.10.
34. Id. at 226.
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seems correct, it also suggests that the modification does not
go far enough. Why not shift to more general just-cause
termination? Furthermore, the at-will rule also can be
rendered more defensible if limited by a tort theory.
Bodie argues that the contract approach is better than a
tort approach because "[i]t keeps contractual performance
within the contractual sphere . . . ."13 While he sees this as
an argument for the Restatement approach, I see it as an
argument against it. Contract law tenets have been savagely
distorted in the context of employment law because of the
overwhelming strength of employment at will, and Professor
Bodie acknowledges this. 3 6 There are numerous examples.
Most courts require a precise form of evidence to overcome
the at-will presumption and routinely dismiss evidence that
would be deemed probative of most other types of contracts. 37
The
employment
contract
concepts
of additional
consideration and mutuality of obligation, which are often
invoked to defeat contracts alleged to be other than at-will,
are corruptions of traditional contract doctrine foisted on
employment law by the need to preserve employment at
will.38 The contract tenet most analogous to Bodie's implied
term is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
In fact, the Restatement comments recognize that the
proposed implied contract term is really a subset of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.39 As Bodie himself
acknowledges, that concept has virtually disappeared from
employment law40 after a somewhat successful period in the
1970s and 80s. 41 Simply put, contract law in the context of

35. Id. at 264.
36. See id. at 227-33.
37. See id. at 229.
38. See, e.g., Blades, supra note 24, at 1419-21; Parker, supra note 24, at 38589.
39. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw

§

7.08 cmt. g (Am. Law Inst. 2015).

40. See Bodie, supra note 12, at 232-33.
41. See,

e.g.,

Rachel

Arnow-Richman,

Modifying At-Will

Employment

1080
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employment has been shaped, distorted, and dominated by
employment at will, and there is no basis for thinking that
an implied contract term will significantly change that
state.42
The Restatement's implied agreement draws a line
between conduct that occurs in the context of the
employment relationship, which is not protected, and
conduct that has no significant impact on that relationship,
which is protected. 43 Conduct that occurs "outside of the
workplace" is protected if the conduct does not "refer to or
otherwise involve the employer." 44 The workplace is defined
in terms of location, hours, and responsibilities. 45 In the past,
it has been common to refer to employees as having greater
autonomy interests and employers as having less interest in
employee activities outside the workplace. 46 Although
historically this was a reliable demarcation for many jobs,
the restructuring of jobs and advances in information
technology have caused this distinction to become
increasingly chimerical for many jobs. 4 7 Admittedly, the
Restatement attempts to take account of these changes, 48 but
as the workplace continues to evolve and technology
advances, it would seem that defining the parameters of the
workplace and scope of employment is a moving target. The
Restatement does not protect all outside conduct, however, as

Contracts, 57 B.C. L. REV. 427, 469-74 (2016).

42. Professor Lawrence Blades, whose pathbreaking 1967 article proposed
the tort of abusive discharge, considered and rejected an implied contract term
as inefficacious in protecting employees. Blades, supra note 24, at 1421-22
(stating "it seems reasonable to bypass the law of contracts and its unyielding
requirement of consideration by turning to the more elastic principles of tort
law . .. .").
43. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw
44. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW

§
§

7.08; see also Bodie, supra note 12, at 264.
7.08 cmt. c.

45. Id.
46. See, e.g., WILLBORN, supra note 24, at 277-79.
47. Professor Bodie recognizes this concern. See Bodie, supra note 12, at 266.
48. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW

§

7.08 cmt. c.
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it exempts conduct that refers to or otherwise involves the
employer. 49 Not only does the Restatement limit the
protected conduct as stated, but it also provides an
affirmative defense5 0 that employers are not liable if they can
prove a "reasonable and good-faith belief that the employee's
exercise of an autonomy interest interfered with the
employer's legitimate business interests, including its
orderly operations and reputation in the marketplace."51
Thus, precisely what autonomy interests are protected and
under what circumstances they are protected is a complex
and nuanced issue. Can such a matter plausibly be depicted
as the subject of an implied understanding? It seems that the
complexity of the matter will foment disagreement over the
scope of protection and considerable litigation. Moreover, the
Restatement's limitation on protected conduct and the
employer affirmative defense suggest that, against a
backdrop of employment at will, courts will afford employers
considerable deference in determining that employee
conduct affects the employer in some way. 5 2
Not only is the implied term beset with uncertainty, it
also seems underinclusive. An employee may say or do things
at work or during working hours that ought to be protected..
For example, if an employer permits expression of some
political views at the workplace, I think that an employee
should be protected in expressing contrary views at the

§ 7.08 cmt. d.
50. Id. § 7.08 cmt. h (statingthat § 7.08(c) is an affirmative defense).
51. Id. § 7.08(c). The point is that employers can almost always show some
49. Id.

connection between work and what an employee does or believes. Blades, supra

note 24, at 1406. Thus, the pivotal issue should be whether the employer's
legitimate concerns weighed against the employee's autonomy interests justify

the interference. Id. at 1407. As will be discussed below, this balancing of
interests is better addressed by a tort theory of recovery than by an implied

agreement that could not credibly be said to take this balancing into account in
advance.
52. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 7.08 cmt. g (stating that employment at
will, recognized in § 2.01, "leaves undisturbed an employer's broad discretion" to
assess deleterious effect on work or the company's reputation).
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workplace. In the end, it seems to me that an implied
contract term regarding an employee's protected autonomy
interests is complicated and amorphous, and it may not
capture the full range of conduct that should be protected. A
tort theory need not resolve all the nuances in advance.
The most significant problem with the proposed impliedcontract-term approach is that it would fail to protect
employees' autonomy interests for practical reasons. Setting
the default in favor of employees would not prevent
employers from taking it away from them by contract.
Employers now routinely take rights from employees in
boilerplate contract provisions. Most notable are mandatory
arbitration provisions, which take the employees' right to
litigate their claims in court (often accompanied by waivers
of rights to pursue class or collective claims). 53 Also,
employers use noncompete agreements to restrict employees'
freedom to work for competitors when they separate from
employment with the employer. There is nothing to prevent
employers from taking the proposed implied term not to
terminate for exercises of autonomy. So, will courts prevent
the taking of the right by refusing to enforce such
agreements? No. To believe that courts will not permit
employers to do so without giving employees consideration is
to ignore the existing examples. Will employers choose to
leave the default presumption in place, not forcing employees
to forfeit their autonomy rights? No. First, as Bodie
recognizes, if a just cause rule were adopted "employers are
54
in a much better position to bargain out of the default." The

same is true of the proposed autonomy presumption. Bodie
argues that we should "see how employers adapt to the new
default" before making more radical changes to employment
at will.65 We should be able to predict reliably that employers

will take this right as they have taken others. It is not

53. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
54. Bodie, supra note 12, at 263.
55. Id. at 265-66.
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because employers are evil; rather, they make the
economically reasonable and efficient decisions to avoid
regulation when they can.
III. THE ADVANTAGES OF A TORT APPROACH

I favor the road not taken by the Restatemen t 56 -further
development of the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy (WDVPP) as the common law option to provide
protection of employees' autonomy interests. There are
numerous reasons that the tort approach is preferable.
First, relying on the tort to protect employees' autonomy
interests avoids the pitfalls of contract law in the
employment context-doctrine that is dominated and
warped by employment at will. 57 Doctrinally, courts do not
have to accept weakening of employment at will in the realm
of contract law to permit recovery under WDVPP."5 The tort
does not depend upon the understandings and intentions of

56. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw

§

5.02 cmt. a (stating that the sections on

wrongful discharge in violation of public policy "do[] not address whether
employers engage in tortious behavior if they discharge employees for certain offduty conduct implicating protected privacy or autonomy interests.").
57. See supra text accompanying notes 35-42.
58. Admittedly, many court decisions have expressed reluctance to permit
recovery under the WDVPP theory because of the tort's supposed infringement

on employment at will. See, e.g., Bammert v. Don's Super Valu, Inc., 2002 WI 85,
T 13, 254 Wis. 2d 347, 356,646 N.W.2d 365, 369-70; Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for
Crippled Children, 589 N.E.2d 1241, 1245 (Mass. 1992). However, those decisions
accord the at-will principle importance beyond its contract sphere of influence.
As some commentators have explained: "[A] rule of contract law has no special
place in the decision to recognize a tort for the abuse of a superior economic
position in derogation of public policy .. . . Judicial preoccupation with
employment-at-will suggests the same sort of underlying bias reflected by the
preoccupation with privity of contract prior to the development of modern product
liability law." WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT
TERMINATION: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 137 (2d ed. 1993); see also Timothy J. Coley,

Contracts, Custom, and the Common Law: Towards a Renewed Prominence for
Contract Law in American Wrongful Discharge Jurisprudence, 24 BYU J. PUB.
POL'Y 193, 215 (2010) (observing that "[u]nlike the implied contract doctrine
discussed immediately above and the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing discussed below, the public policy doctrine does-not stand in such direct
tension with contractual employment.").
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the parties.
A related point is that the tort approach offers a better
prospect for acceptance by courts because it does not require
them to subscribe to an implied contract term that almost
certainly does not reflect the understanding of the parties. 59
Furthermore, the tort is currently recognized by all but a few
states;6 0 thus, this is an argument for expansion of an
existing theory rather than recognition of an entirely new
theory.
A second argument in favor of the tort is that the scope
of the protection is not limited by the amorphous and
increasingly antiquated concept of scope of employment. 6 1
Although the tort is beset by its own scope-of-coverage
issue-defining "public policy" 6 2 -that

is not an issue that is

of diminishing relevance in modern workplaces. Courts can
adopt more expansive approaches to defining public policy.
The most important reason that the tort approach is
preferable is that the tort, unlike the proposed default rule
based on an implied understanding, cannot be divested by an
employer's supposed bargaining-and more likely coercion. 63
This is the paramount advantage because a protection that
can be taken away by one party is not much protection at all.
Professor Bodie and the Restatement present an accurate
depiction of the tort of WDVPP in a narrowly cabined form 6 4
as most states have adopted it. The crucial limitation is that

59. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34.
60. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw

§

5.01 cmt. a.

61. See supra text accompanying notes 43-52.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 64-72.
63. Tort law imposes duties on parties in the interest of society regardless of
the obligations they agree to in contract. See, e.g., Michael H. Cohen, Comment,

Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faithand FairDealing
as a Tort, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1291,1306-07 (1985) (describingthe covenant of good
faith and fair dealing as nonconsensual and extracontractual, and recommending
recognition of breach of that covenant as a tort).
64. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW

§§

5.01-5.03.
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there must be a clearly defined public policy such that the
termination harms not just the fired employee but also
injures the public. 6 5 Courts often decline to find a public

policy implicated in a termination. 66 There are narrow and
more expansive approaches to defining and identifying
public policy, 6 7 but there is no coherent view of what public

policy means in this context and no reasoned elaboration of
the basis for the public/private dichotomy. 68 As one court
expressed it, "[T]he Achilles heel of [WDVPP] lies in the
definition of public policy." 69 The public policy element and
limitation is the principal reason that Bodie finds the tort illsuited to protecting employees' autonomy interests. 7 0 Yet, he
acknowledges that the tort reminds us that employees are
also "citizens within a larger community,"7 1 who have "social
rights, duties, and responsibilities." 72
While the presentation of the narrow view of WDVPP is
an accurate description of the majority approach among
courts, and may be appropriate for a Restatement project,
there are different views on that matter. 73 As Bodie and the
Restatement acknowledge, there also is authority for a

65. Bodie, supra note 12, at 250 (stating that "autonomy concerns are
generally secondary to the primary concern: encouragement of actions that

benefit the public").
66. One of the most shocking cases to deny recovery is Green v. Bryant, 887

F. Supp. 798, 800-03 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (denying recovery to a plaintiff allegedly
fired because she was beaten by her spouse).
67. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw

§

5.03; Note, Protecting Employees

at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1931, 1947-48 (1983) [hereinafter Protecting Employees].
68. See Protecting Employees, supra note 67, at 1947-49.

69. Palmateerv. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (111. 1981).
70. Bodie, supra note 12, at 259-60 (statingthat "[a]t its core
policy tort is designed to protect public interests").

...

the public-

71. Id. at 250.
72. Id. (quoting Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79).
73. See, e.g., Reuel Schiller, "It is Not Wisdom, But Authority That Makes a
Law:" A Historical Perspective on the Problem of Creating a Restatement of

Employment Law, 13 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 39, 39-42 (2009).
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broader version of the tort. 74 In contrast to the Restatement's
description of WDVPP, the Restatement did not adopt an
existing and static snapshot of the law regarding the
contractual approach it favors; the implied agreement is a
significant modification of the existing law. 7 5 Thus, I argue
for expansion of WDVPP to protect employees' autonomy
rights, drawing from both its origins and some of the more
expansive development of the tort.
The tort of WDVPP traces its origin in the United States
to a 1959 California Court of Appeals decision, Petermann v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters.76 The tort gained
academic traction and more momentum in the courts after
Professor Lawrence Blades advocated for recognition of a tort
of abusive discharge.77 Blades argued that the power of
corporations had come to rival that of governments and that
it was anomalous that the law placed restrictions on
government action against citizens but not actions of
corporations and other employers that result in discharge of
employees. 78 Using the torts of abuse of process and
intentional interference with contractual relations by a third
party as models, combined with the underlying rationale of
prima facie tort, Blades crafted a tort of abusive discharge. 79

74.

See RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw

§

5.02 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2015); Bodie,

supra note 12, at 250-51 (discussing Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d
894, 898-901 (3d Cir. 1983)).
75.

See supra note

Reporter's Notes to

32, discussing Professor Bodie's statement in the

§ 7.08 that the implied agreement is a change in the law.

76. 344 P.2d 25, 26-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
77. See Blades, supra note 24, at 1413. Professor Blades's article has been
cited by 88 court decisions and 542 secondary sources as of October 27, 2018.
Walter Olson declared that the article "kicked off the modern revolution in state

employment law." Walter Olson, The Trouble With Employment Law, 8 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 32, 32 (1999); see also Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At- Will: The
Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 653, 659 (2000) (noting that,
afterPetermann, courts in other states did not begin adopting WDVPP until after
the publication of Blades's article).
78. Blades, supra note 24, at 1404; see also Estlund, supra note 27, at 795-96
(discussing "private government").

79. Blades, supra note 24, at 1423-25.
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The proposed tort would provide a remedy when an employer
discharges an employee in order to effectuate an ulterior
purpose, other than that for which the right to discharge was
designed.80 Although Blades acknowledged the argument for
the more radical approach of extending all constitutional
restrictions on government to private employers, he saw such
an approach as too expansive and unnecessary if legislatures
enacted statutes or courts developed theories to stem the tide
of abusive discharges.s'
The tort of WDVPP recognized today is not the broader
abusive discharge tort envisioned by Professor Blades. 82
Nonetheless, there have been many court decisions and
innovations that demonstrate the capacity of the tort to
protect employees' autonomy interests. While most courts 83
and the Restatement84 limit the tort to four or five categories
of fact situations, Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr. articulated
an elements-based approach, 85 which obviates the necessity
of plaintiffs fitting their claims into one of the categories. 86
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1432 ("If contrary to this assumption, the legislatures or the courts

proceed quickly with the task of developing other approaches, it will not be
necessary to resort to the drastic yet inadequate step of limiting the exercise of
private power through recourse to constitutional law.").

82. See Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the
Model Employment TerminationAct, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 849, 868 & n.100 (1994).
83. States usually recognize one or more of four fact patterns as actionable

under the tort: (1) refusal to participate in illegal activity; (2) exercise of a right;
(3) performance of a duty; or (4) reporting illegal activity (whistleblowing). MARK
A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAw 632-47 (5th ed. 2014).
84. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw

§

5.02 (Am. Law Inst. 2015).

85. Plaintiffs must prove (1) clear public policy; (2) discouraging plaintiffs
conduct by termination would jeopardize the public policy; (3) the public-policy
linked conduct caused the termination; and (4) the employer cannot offer an
overriding justification for the termination. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., WORKPLACE
TORTS: RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES § 3.7 (1991). Courts in Iowa, Ohio, Washington,

and West Virginia also have adopted this approach. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v.
Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 281 (Iowa 2000); Collins v. Rizkana, 652
N.E.2d 653, 657-58 (Ohio 1995); Gardner v. Loomis, 913 P.2d 377, 382 (Wash.
1996); Swears v. R.M. Roach & Sons, 696 S.E.2d 1, 6 (W. Va. 2010).
86. There are other useful proposals to expand the tort. See, e.g., Parker,
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One particular court decision demonstrates the potential
of the tort theory to provide redress to employees who are
fired for asserting their autonomy rights. The Third Circuit
relied on Pennsylvania's tort of WDVPP to reinstate a
plaintiffs claim that he was fired for not complying with his
employer's requirement that he advocate for passage of a law
by obtaining signatures on a petition addressed to the state
legislature in Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co.8 7 The

fired employee sued for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy. 88 The court located the public policy of free
expression in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
and the analogous provision in the Pennsylvania
Constitution. 89 On denial of rehearing, one judge dissented,
noting that the majority "ignore [d] the state action
requirement of first amendment jurisprudence."90 Following
that reasoning, other courts have refused to find the public
policy for the tort in the First Amendment. 91 Even the Third
Circuit, which decided Novosel, seems to have retreated from
that position. 92
Novosel is important because it implicates one of the
"rights and privileges which [is] considered so important to a
free society that [it is] constitutionally protected from

supra note 24, at 402-04 (proposing that courts permit recovery for abusive
discharge when the reason, if included in a contract, would result in the contract

not being enforced).
87. 721 F.2d 894,896 (3d Cir. 1983).
88. Id. at 896.
89. Id. at 899.
90. Id. at 904 (Becker, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing); see also
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, at 628 ("The United States Constitution is a

problematic source of public policy to support a claim of wrongful discharge,
because most federal constitutional provisions protect only against abuses of
government power.").
91. See Bodie, supra note 12, at 251-52; see also ROTHSTEIN ETAL., supra note

83, at 628-29.
92. Bodie, supra note 12, at 251 (citing Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963
F.2d 611, 619-20 (3d Cir. 1992)).

2018]

PROTECTING EMPLOYEES'AUTONOMY

1089

government encroachment." 93 The expansive approach taken
by the Third Circuit thus harkens back to Blades's urging
that tort theory should protect employees against abusive
discharges by employers as constitutional restrictions
protect citizens against abusive intrusions by government.
Although Professor Bodie sees little prospect for extension of
Novosel,94 I see it as broadening the tort theory along the
lines described by Professor Blades. This is appropriate
because protecting the autonomy rights of employees, who
are people and citizens, is important not just to the
individuals, but to society as a whole. 95
The tort of WDVPP, as recognized in most states today,
does not provide adequate protection of employees'
autonomy. There are, however,
developments that
demonstrate its capacity to fulfill this role.9 6 Professor Bodie

argues that the balancing of employer and employee
interests necessarily implicated by employee autonomy
should be left in the hands of the parties via the implied
agreement rather than entrusted to courts under the tort. 97
The record of contract law in employment and the penchant
of employers to take rights of employees protected by only
93. Blades, supra note 24, at 1407.
94. Bodie, supra note 12, at 251-52.
95. For example, Professor Samuel Bagenstos posits that protections of
privacy and autonomy are not protections of individuals' interests alone, but also
promote social equality as they protect a person's status as a full-fledged member
of the community. Bagenstos, supra note 27, at 248; see also FINKIN, supra note
11, at xxxix (asserting that autonomy and privacy play important roles in the

formation and maintenance of self-identity and that to cease to bear such rights
is to be dehumanized).
96. Employers can, of course, take adverse actions against employees short of
termination. The Restatement takes the position that constructive discharge is
covered by the tort, but it does not take a position on extending the tort to other
wrongful discipline. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw § 5.01 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst.
2015). I do not advocate such expansion because courts are reluctant to oversee
employers' personnel decisions even on the matter of termination. To subject all
disciplinary actions to court review is to make courts super personnel boards and
to impinge too much on employer operational prerogative. Cf. Blades, supra note
24, at 1406.

97. Bodie, supra note 12, at 261.
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default rules demonstrates why the protection must be
entrusted to courts applying tort theory.
IV. CONCLUSION

I commend the Restatement of Employment Law and
Professor Bodie for seeking to move the law in the direction
of providing greater protection of employees' autonomy
rights. It is important for not just the individuals but also for
our society. I also agree that developing a more robust
common law is the appropriate road. I disagree regarding the
better common law approach to achieve the objective.
Contract law is the domain of employment at will. The tort
of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy offers a
better way around employment at will.

